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ABSTRACT In the last decade or so, we have experienced a tremendous proliferation and popularity of
different Social Networks (SNs), resulting more and more user attributes being stored in such SNs. These
attributes represent a valuable asset and many innovative online services are offered in exchange of such
attributes. This particular phenomenon has allured these social networks to act as Identity Providers (IdPs).
However, the current setting unnecessarily imposes a restriction: a user can only release attributes from one
single IdP in a single session, thereby, limiting the user to aggregate attributes from multiple IdPs within the
same session. In addition, our analysis suggests that the manner by which attributes are released from these
SNs is extremely privacy-invasive and a user has very limited control to exercise her privacy during this
process. In this article, we present Social Anchor, a system for attribute aggregation from social networks in
a privacy-friendly fashion. Our proposed Social Anchor system effectively addresses both of these serious
issues. Apart from the proposal, we have implemented Social Anchor following a set of security and privacy
requirements.We have also examined the associated trust issues using a formal trust analysis model. Besides,
we have presented a formal analysis of its protocols using a state-of-the-art formal analysis tool called
AVISPA to ensure the security of Social Anchor. Finally, we have provided a performance analysis of Social
Anchor.
INDEX TERMS Attribute aggregation, privacy, social networks, SAML, OpenID, OAuth, AVISPA.
I. INTRODUCTION
A plethora of different types of Social Networks (SNs) have
emerged in recent years providing a wide variety of online
services in different domains with different use-cases. Many
of these social networks have received wide-spread adoption
and have been deeply integrated into our day to day lives.
A recent study indicated that social networks users reached
around 22.7 billions in 2017 [1]. With such deep integration
in our lives, these social networks are increasingly being used
in different application domains. The consequence of this is
that an increasing amount of user attributes are stored in these
social networks.
These attributes represent our identities in a wide variety
of scenarios in different time periods. In such, they are very
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
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lucrative to other online service providers to understand our
contexts and to offer more personalised services in exchange
of such attributes. The demand for these attributes has allured
social networking sites to extend their model so that they can
act as Identity Providers (IdPs) and provide such attributes to
third party online Service Providers (SPs). This has created
a new business model for the social networks by which users
can access such online services by leveraging the identities in
their existing social networks. This is also beneficial to users
as there is no need to register yet again to access a new online
service and create a new set of attributes in a new SP.
However, the current setting of accessing online services
by leveraging social networks has imposed an unnecessary
restriction: a user can only release attributes from one single
IdP in a single session. This restriction has this underlying
unjustified assumption that a user needs to utilise only one
IdP for service provisioning as if there was only one IdP to
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store all her attributes. In reality, users have different types of
attributes scattered in multitude of different IdPs and social
networking sites.
To highlight this restriction, let us consider a real-life
scenario. Imagine a user, named Alice, wants to buy an age-
restricted product from her favourite online shop. She might
need to use her Governmental IdP (e.g. Passport or Driving
authorities who issue her passport or driving licence) to prove
her age, her bank details to pay for the product and her loyalty
card information to collect loyalty points from the loyalty
card provider during this purchase. All this information is
stored at different IdPs and the current setting of online
services does not allow Alice to provide all this information
in a single session (e.g. during her purchase). In other words,
Alice will need to retrieve all the required information from
different providers and submit them manually at the online
shop. Allowing users to aggregate attributes from different
providers will enable them to release these attributes to a ser-
vice provider in a single service session in a semi-automatic
fashion. Thus, it would also enable service providers to offer
more innovative services that have not been possible so far.
Within the scope of this paper, a more relevant and specific
example can be something as follows. Let us consider another
user Tom who maintains three different social networking
sites: LinkedIn (to maintain professional activities), Twitter
(to follow well-known professionals and to get almost real-
time updates on professional fields) and Facebook (to main-
tain social activities). Tom has recently completed a project
quite successfully which has been updated on his LinkedIn
profile. One of the most well-known technologists has shared
the news of this project on Twitter praising the role Tom
played on the successful completion of the project. Similarly,
he has written a technical note on Facebook regarding his
project which has received thousands of shares all over the
worlds. Tom thinks that such a tweet and his popular technical
note would add significant values to his resume and in his
future career, for example when he applies for his next job.
There is no way for Tom to aggregate such information
from different social networks in the current setting of online
services so that he could submit all his achievements to his
future employer. One of the ways this could be achieved is
attribute aggregation.
Another important aspect of releasing attributes using a
social network to a third party service provider is the issue of
privacy. This is because many of the attributes stored in such
social networks are highly private in nature. Therefore, it is
crucial to ensure that users have enough control to exercise
her privacy while the attributes are being released to the ser-
vice providers. Within this scope, we have investigated how
privacy-friendly is the attribute release process using different
popular social networking sites. Our findings suggest that
the attribute release process is extremely privacy-invasive and
users have very limited control during the process.
In this article, we aim to mitigate both of these serious
issues. Towards this aim, we present Social Anchor, a system
for attribute aggregation from social networks in a privacy-
friendly fashion. Social Anchor is based on the work of
Ferdous et al. [2] and allows a user aggregating attributes
from different social networks and release them to a service
provider in a secure and privacy-friendly mechanism with
different levels of privacy control.
Contribution. This article has the following major
contributions:
• At first, we highlight the shortcomings of the existing
systems by presenting a detailed privacy analysis of
how attributes are released from different social network
sites.
• We present Social Anchor, the first ever system to allow
users to collate attributes from several social network
IdPs (SN IdPs, in short) in a privacy-friendly fashion,
with a detailed discussion of how its proof of concept
has been developed and implemented following a rig-
orous threat model and detailed requirement analysis to
mitigate the identified threats.
• We analyse the underlying trust issues using a formal
model of trust.
• We showcase its applicability by illustrating two differ-
ent use-cases using the proof of concept.
• We present a formal analysis of Social Anchor protocols
using a state-of-the-art protocol verification tool called
AVISPA [3], [4] to ensure the security of its underlying
protocols.
• Finally,We present a comparative performance analysis,
in terms of latency, of Social Anchor to highlight its
efficacy.
Structure. The structure of the paper is as follows.
In Section II, we present a short background on Identity
and Identity Management and briefly introduce a model of
Identity and Attribute Aggregation. Section III presents our
analysis on how attributes are released from different SN
IdPs using different protocols and highlights the major lim-
itations of the existing approach and the impact it has on
the privacy of users. Social Anchor is based on the work
of [2] in which a Hybrid model of Attribute Aggregation
is showcased. We briefly describe the Hybrid Model in
Section IV and underline the necessity of introducing Social
Anchor. Section V presents two different architectures of
Social Anchor to offer a user different levels of privacy con-
trols during the attribute aggregation process along with their
associated algorithms, underlying threat model, a thorough
requirement analysis, implementation details and a formal
analysis of its underlying trust issues. Section VI illustrates
the applicability of Social Anchor by presenting two different
use-cases. We present a formal security analysis of Social
Anchor using AVISPA in Section VII with a discussion of
its privacy and performance analysis, the advantages Social
Anchor offers and the current limitations it has. We explore
the existing related works and compare them with Social
Anchor against a set of criteria in Section VIII. Finally,
we conclude in Section IX with a hint of future work.
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II. BACKGROUND
This section provides a brief background of Identity and
the related concepts of Identity Management and Identity
Management systems. This will help the readers to under-
stand how different attributes in any social network make
up the notion of identities for users in the corresponding
social networks. A mathematical model helps to concretise
the understanding and follow the associated protocols and
formal analysis of Social Anchor in the subsequent sections.
That is why a brief mathematical model of identities and
attribute aggregation is also presented.
A. IDENTITY, IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AND
FEDERATED IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
As per [5], an entity is a physical or logical object which
can be uniquely identified within a certain context with
its own identity. In this article, we only consider users as
entities.
To provide a mathematical definition of the identity of a
user, we utilise the Digital Identity Model (DIM) [6]. The
model argues that the (whole) identity of a user actually
consists of a set of partial identities, where each partial
identity is valid within the domain (context) of an enterprise
(organisation, e.g. an SN). Moreover, each partial identity
encodes a number of attributes and their corresponding val-
ues, representing different characteristics of a user. Next,
we elaborate this relation mathematically.
We assume that the set of domains is denoted with D
whereas the domain of a single organisation is denoted with
d . We useUd , Ad and AVd to denote the set of users, the set of
attributes and the set of values for those attributes in d . The
following partial function relates users and their attributes in
a domain:
Definition 1: Let atEntToVald : Ad×Ud → AVd be the
(partial) function that for an entity and attribute returns the
corresponding value of the attribute in domain d.
The function is defined as a partial function to emulate
the settings of practical systems. For example, such systems
often have some compulsory attributes (e.g. email, telephone
number, etc.) whose values must be provided by the users.
At the same time, such systems can also have some optional
attributes (e.g. postal addresses, age, etc.) for which users
may not provide any values.
Next, the partial identity of a user u is defined using the
following definition.
Definition 2: For a domain d, the partial identity of a user
u ∈ Ud within d, denoted parIdentud , is given by the set:
{(a, v) |a ∈ Ad , atEntToVald (a, u) is defined and equals v} .
Considering there are n valid attribute-value pairs for a user
u, the partial identity of u in d can be defined as:
parIdentud , 〈 (a1, v1), (a2, v2), (a3, v3) . . . (an, vn) 〉
Ultimately, we define the (total/whole) identity of a user u
as the union of all her partial identities in all domains.
Definition 3: For an entity u ∈ U, the identity of u is given
by the set:
identu ,
⋃
〈 (d, parIdentud ) | d ∈ DOMAIN and u ∈ Ud 〉
Identity Management (IdM) is the concept to facilitate
the management of digital identities [5]. Formally, Identity
Management can be considered as the combinations of dif-
ferent technologies and policies that are used to represent and
recognise any entity with its digital identities [7]. An Identity
Management System (IMS) is a system that is used for facil-
itating identity management. Generally, each IMS interacts
with the following parties:
• Client/User.A client/user is entity that receives services
from a service provider (see below).
• Service Provider. A Service Provider (SP) is an entity,
mostly an organisation, that is responsible for providing
services to the clients or to other SPs. In other terminolo-
gies, it is also regarded as the Relying Party.
• Identity Provider. An Identity Provider (IdP) is an
entity, alsomostly an organisation, that is responsible for
storing digital identities of clients and enabling clients to
utilise their identities to receive services from an SP.
Among different models of identity management, Feder-
ated Identity Management (FIM) is one of the most widely
used. It is based on the concept of Identity Federation where a
federation is actually a legally binding business and technical
contract among a group of two or more trusted organisations
to allow their users to access restricted resources from dif-
ferent domains in a secure and seamless manner [8], [9].
Organisations in a federation thus form the so-called Circle
of Trust (CoT) to signify their assumed trusted relationship.
Within this relationship, FIM offers the Single Sign On (SSO)
capability which enables any user to log in to the IdP of one
organisation and then access services from other federated
SPs without further logins. This alleviates the need for a user
to authenticate each time she needs to access the federated
services.
Sharing partial identities of users between different organ-
isations (e.g. an IdP and SP) is a crucial functionality of any
IMS. To preserve the privacy of the user, it is essential to
ensure that the full partial identity (encoding the values of
all attributes) of the user is never shared. Instead, a limited
subset of the partial identity of the user is released during this
process. We define this limited subset as the profile of a user
in a single session. Mathematically, a profile is a subset of
the partial identity of a user within a domain: PROFILEud ⊆
parIdentud . Hence, we can define the profile of a user u ∈ Ud
in domain d in the following way, where j ≤ n:
PROFILEud ,
⋃
〈 (a1, v1), (a2, v2), (a3, v3) . . . (aj, vj) 〉
One of the attributes shared within a profile is an identifier
which is used to uniquely identify a user in an IdP as well
as in an SP. There are two types of identifier: persistent and
transient/pseudonymous. A persistent identifier is permanent
in nature and is used, accompanied by a special attribute
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TABLE 1. SAML/OpenID/OAuth notations.
called credential, during the authentication process. A per-
sistent identifier can be of different types such as a username,
email and phone number while passwords are themost promi-
nent credential nowadays. Conversely, a transient identifier is
generated per session basis and is targeted for a specific SP.
To preserve the privacy of a user, a profile generally contains
a transient identifier to allow an SP maintaining a session for
the user. This also undermines the threat where twomalicious
SPs collude to build a profile and ultimately track a user over
their domains.
B. ATTRIBUTE AGGREGATION
As per [2], Attribute Aggregation is the process that allows
a user to aggregate or combine her attributes from several
identity providers and release them to an SP in a single
session. Since a profile is utilised while attributes are released
from an IdP to an SP, we can regard the attribute aggregation
process as the aggregation of profiles of a user from different
IdPs. Mathematically, we can define the set of aggregated
profiles in the following way:
For a user u, the set of aggregated attributes of u, denoted
by Att−Aggu is given by:
Att−Aggu ,
⋃
〈 PROFILEud | d ∈ DOMAIN 〉
There are several existing attribute aggregation models.
A description and comparative analysis of these models can
be found in [10].
III. ANALYSING EXISTING IDENTITY MANAGEMENT
STANDARDS & SOCIAL NETWORKS
Currently, there are three popular Identity Management Stan-
dards, namely SAML (Security Assertion Markup Lan-
guage) [11], OpenID [12], [13] and OAuth [14]. SAML is
widely used in educational and Governmental settings within
a trusted federation (explained below) while many popu-
lar social networks utilise OpenID and OAuth protocols to
authenticate users and release their attributes to third party
service providers. Even though there is an existing work
which supports integrating such social networks with SAML
federations [15] to offer federated services, it has never
been investigated how attributes are released from different
social network sites using these protocols. At first, we have
examined these issues. In particular, we are interested to
see if a user can leverage the chosen protocols to request
a specific set of attributes (denoted as Attribute Request),
to select and release specific attributes from the chosen social
network sites (denoted as Selective Disclosure) and if the
social networks sites have any support for attribute aggre-
gation (denoted as Attribute Aggregation). Our findings are
presented below with a brief discussion of each technology.
A. SAML
SAML is one of the most widely deployed federated iden-
tity management technologies [11]. It is based on XML
(EXtensible Markup Language) and facilitates the exchange
of authentication and authorisation information between
different organisations in different domains. It utilises a
request/response protocol that allows one party (an SP) to
request identity information regarding a user which is then
followed by response from the other party (an IdP) with the
information by means of an assertion.
A SAML protocol flow between a user (denoted as u),
an IdP (denoted as idp) and an SP (denoted as sp) is presented
below using the notations presented in Table 1 [2].
While trying to access a service provided by sp, u is
forwarded to a special service called the Discovery Ser-
vice or Where Are You From (WAYF) Service. The WAYF
shows a list pre-configured trusted IdPs (IDPwayf ) to u. After
choosing her preferred IdP (idp ∈ IDPwayf ), u is forwarded
to idp with a SAML authentication request consisting of
an identifier of the request and an identifier (called entity
ID in SAML) of sp. A SAML request is denoted using
AuthnReq and ismodelled as presented in Table 1, where id req
representing the identifier in each SAML request and id sp
denoting the entity ID of sp. At idp, u is authenticated at first
and then idp prepares a SAML response with an embedded
SAML assertion. The assertion contains the user profile as
released by idp. Mathematically, the assertion is denoted with
SAMLAssrtn and is modelled as per Table 1.
Then, idp digitally signs the (encrypted or unencrypted)
SAML assertion and then embeds it inside a SAML response.
The response also contains the request identifier (id req),
the entity ID (id idp) of idp and the entity ID (id sp) of sp.
A SAML response is denoted with SAMLResp and modelled
as per Table 1. Table 1 also introduces the following two
notations:
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• {SAMLAssrtn}K−1idp represents an assertion which is digi-
tally signed with the private key of idp (K−1idp )
• {EncSAMLAssrtn}K−1idp represents an encrypted assertion
which is encrypted with the public key of sp (Ksp) and
signed with the private key of idp (K−1idp )
Finally, the response is sent back to sp by the idp. Upon
receiving the response, the (encrypted/unencrypted) SAML
assertion is extracted. If the response consists of an encrypted
assertion, sp decrypts the assertion at first with the private
key of sp (K−1sp ) and then validates the signature with the
public key of idp (Kidp). In case of an an unencrypted asser-
tion, sp just validates its signature using the public key of
idp. sp retrieves the embedded user attributes (the profile,
PROFILEuidp) from the assertion, only if the signature is valid,
otherwise the assertion is discarded.
This protocol flow requires establishing a notion of trust
between an IdP and an SP within a federation. This notion
of trust is established by exchanging the respective meta-
data of the IdP and SP and which are then stored at the
appropriate repositories. In this way, each party builds up the
Trust Anchor List (TAL). Upon completing the exchange of
metadata, the IdP and SP are regarded belonging to the same
federation (the CoT or Circle of Trust).
SAML has many implementations: Shibboleth [16], Sim-
pleSAMLphp [17] and ZXID [18]. Among them, only
Shibboleth and SimpleSAMLphp are widely used. In [2],
it has been analysed how SAML and SimpleSAMLphp have
been combined for attribute request, selective disclosure and
attribute aggregation. For brevity, we are not repeating the
analysis process here. The interested readers are requested
to consult [2] for understanding how the analysis has been
carried out. However, the result of our analysis is presented
in Section III-D.
B. OpenID
OpenID is aimed to provide SSO (Single Sign On) solutions
for web services using decentralised IMS [12], [13]. Like
SAML, it consists of three parties : Users, OpenID Providers
and Service Providers. It also utilises a request/response pro-
tocol which is founded upon the open trust paradigmmeaning
every party in OpenID trusts each other without formally
establishing trust like SAML.
The protocol flow in OpenID starts when a user submits
a request to access a service provided by an SP, also known
as RP or Relying Party in OpenID terminology. Upon pro-
viding her OpenID identifier, the user is forwarded to the
provider where she is authenticated. Then, the user returns
back to the SP with an authentication response which is then
validated. If the response contains the profile of the user
as released by the provider, the user attributes embedded
within the profile are extracted from the response. Based on
these attributes, the SP takes an authorisation decision. Like
SAML, an OpenID request and response are denoted with
OpenIDReq and OpenIDResp respectively. Table 1 presents
how they are modelled, where id req, id idp and id rp denote the
identifier for the request, the endpoint of the provider and the
RP identifier respectively. Moreover, the URL of the SP at
where the response needs to be returned is denoted with urlsp.
Finally, {PROFILEuidp}K−1idp represents a user profile digitally
signed with the private key of the provider.
The original OpenID protocol was intended for authentica-
tion only, hence, the aspect of exchanging attributes was not
initially considered. However, two extensions, the OpenID
Simple Registration Extension (SREG) [19] and the OpenID
Attribute Exchange (AX) [20], have been added to the origi-
nal OpenID specification to allow an RP to request and fetch
attributes from the provider. Such extensions allow an RP to
request attributes from the provider and the provider might
ask the user to release the requested attributes which are then
sent back to the RP embedded inside the response.
Within this scope, our intention is to investigate how
a few popular OpenID providers act when they receive
a request to return attributes. We are particularly inter-
ested to see how each provider allows a user to selectively
choose her attributes individually (the selective disclo-
sure of attributes). With these in mind, we have selected
four popular OpenID providers: Yahoo (http://openid.yahoo.
com/), Google (www.google.com), LiveJournal (http://www.
livejournal.com/) and VeriSign (https://pip.verisignlabs.
com/). We have deployed a SAML SP and IdP using the Sim-
pleSAMLphp implementation. Even though the IdP and SP
are based on SAML, SimpleSAMLphp allows different types
of (e.g. OpenID or OAuth enabled) IdPs to be configured
as authentication sources at the IdP which allows a user to
get authenticated at another IdP and return attributes to the
SimpleSAMLphp IdP. At this moment we are not interested
what the SimpleSAMLphp IdP does with the attributes.
We have used this approach because of two reasons:
• since the support of such IdPs are built into Sim-
pleSAMLphp, we do not need to deploy a separate
OpenID or OAuth SP and
• we plan to use a very similar setup for building our proof
of concept of Social Anchor.
We have configured the SimpleSAMLphp OpenIDmodule
to request openid, email, fullname and age attributes among
which the age attribute is optional and the rest are compul-
sory. A typical flow using this approach is as follows: a user
visits the SP and then chooses the SAML IdP. When the user
is forwarded to the SAML IdP, she chooses OpenID as the
authentication source and then she provides her OpenID and
the usual OpenID protocol flow takes place.
We have created dummy user accounts in these providers
that we have used during our experiments. It has been noted
how a provider allows a user to authorise it to release her
attributes, once the user is authenticated or during the user
authentication process and screenshots of the process have
been captured. The screenshots for Yahoo, Google, LiveJour-
nal and VeriSign are illustrated in Figure 1, Figure 2, Figure 3
and Figure 4 respectively. All personal information has been
removed from the screenshots of the paper to preserve privacy
and anonymity.
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FIGURE 1. Yahoo login screen.
FIGURE 2. Google login screen.
We have noted two problems: the login screen does
not inform the user which individual attributes have been
requested (e.g. in Figure 1, the user has no way of knowing
which information will be released) and none of the providers
except VeriSign has any support of selective disclosure. This
practice not only violates the principle of data minimisation
but also forces a user to release attributes based on obscure
information. This may have serious implications on the pri-
vacy of the user.
We have also noted that none of the OpenID implementa-
tions has any attribute aggregation facility.
C. OAuth
OAuth, like OpenID, is based on the concept of open trust.
It is one of the fastest growing systems widely used over the
Internet for delegating the access right of a user to another
user in a secure and more user-friendly fashion [21], [22].
It interacts with four different types of entities.
• Resource Owners. Resource owners emulate the role
of users in SAML and OpenID. They own and control
their protected resources for which they would like to
grant access rights to third parties.
• Clients. Clients represent third party applications which
submit requests to access protected resources on a user’s
behalf.
• Authorisation Servers. Authorisation servers grant
access requests so that clients can access the requested
resources.
• Resource Servers. Resource servers host protected
resources. In many settings, both resource and authori-
sation servers are combined to act as the same entity.
Next, we present a simplified abstract OAuth protocol flow
with the assumption that a resource owner wants to delegate
access rights to a client so that it can access some pro-
tected resources of the resource owner, hosted at a resource
server. At first, the client requests an authorisation for the cor-
responding resources from the owner. The owner authorises
the client by returning a credential called the authorisation
grant. The client is then authenticated at the authorisation
server and provides the authorisation grant. Upon validating
the authorisation grant, the authorisation server issues an
access token. The client then presents the access token to
the resource server in order to access the protected resources.
Upon validating the access token, the resource server returns
the requested resource to the client.
An OAuth request and response are denoted with
OAuthReq and OAuthResp respectively and are modelled as
presented in Table 1, where id req, id rs and urlsp denote the
identifier for the request, the identifier of the resource server
and the URL of the SP to receive any response respectively.
Like before, {PROFILEurs}K−1rs represents a user profile digi-
tally signed with the private key of the resource server.
Unlike OpenID, OAuth does not require any separate
mechanism to exchange attributes since all user attributes are
considered as resources which can be accessed using OAuth
upon approval from the user. Similar to OpenID, we are
particularly interested to see how a user can grant authori-
sation to a client. We have chosen three popular IdPs based
on OAuth: Facebook (https://www.facebook.com), LinkedIn
(http://www.linkedin.com/) and Twitter (https://twitter.com/).
We have used the same SimpleSAMLphp setup to initiate
the OAuth protocol flow. A typical flow is as follows: the
user visits the SP and then chooses the SAML IdP. When
the user is forwarded to the SAML IdP, she chooses one of
the OAuth providers (Facebook, Twitter and LinkedIn) as the
authentication source and then the usual OAuth protocol flow
takes place.
To initiate this protocol flow, a respective application needs
to be registered at each provider. For Facebook, it is at [23],
for LinkedIn it is at [24] and for Twitter it is at [25]. Once the
application is registered, an application key and a correspond-
ing secret are generated. These two pieces of information are
then used at SimpleSAMLphp to initiate the protocol flow
at the respective IdP. In addition, how user attributes can be
requested using a registered application depends entirely on
the respective provider. For Facebook, the application can be
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FIGURE 3. LiveJournal login screen.
FIGURE 4. VeriSign login screen.
configured to request different user attributes or information
regarding requested attributes can be passed as configuration
parameters while initiating the protocol. We have adopted
the second approach. For LinkedIn, the application needs to
be configured to request attributes and it has been config-
ured to request the full public profile and the email address
attributes of a user. For Twitter, the public user attributes
have been requested from SimpleSAMLphp. Like before,
we have noted and captured screenshots of the process by
which a user allows the application to access the requested
attributes. Screenshots for LinkedIn, Facebook and Twitter
are given in Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively.
We have found that, like OpenID providers, the same two
problems exist: the login screen does not inform the user
FIGURE 5. LinkedIn authorisation screen.
which individual attributes have been requested (for example,
in Figure 6 it is not clear which information from the public
profile will be released) and none of the providers has any
support for selective disclosure. A user needs to release either
all attributes or none. This approach also violates the principle
of data minimisation and forces a user to release attributes
based on obscure information and thus can have serious
implications on the privacy of the user.
Similar to OpenID, we have noted that none of the OAuth
provider has any such facility of attribute aggregation.
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TABLE 2. Comparison of protocols and implementations.
FIGURE 6. Facebook authorisation screen.
FIGURE 7. Twitter authorisation screen.
D. SUMMARY
The result of our investigation is presented in Table 2. In the
table, the symbol X indicates that a particular function is
supported by the respective implementation and the symbol
7 signifies the absence of support in a corresponding imple-
mentation.
From the table, Shibboleth allows specific attributes to be
requested by an SP, however, does not support the selective
disclosure function. On the other hand, SimpleSAMLphp
does support the selective disclosure property using its Con-
sentmodule, however, does not allow specific attributes to be
requested. SAML has no mechanism to aggregate attributes,
however, it has been used for the implementations of existing
models of attribute aggregation.
For OpenID and OAuth, even though there is a mechanism
to request specific attributes, a user can hardly perform selec-
tive disclosure of attributes in all the investigated providers
except VeriSign. Also, no provider supporting OAuth and
OpenID has any provision for attribute aggregation from
multiple social networking accounts.
IV. HYBRID MODEL OF ATTRIBUTE AGGREGATION
In [2], a novel Hybrid model of attribute aggregation using
SAML within a federated domain has been proposed. The
proposedmodel is based on the Identity Proxying and Identity
Relay models which are briefly described below.
A. IDENTITY PROXYING (IP) MODEL
A user in this model can aggregate attributes from differ-
ent IdPs by leveraging a trusted IdP called the Proxy IdP
[26], [27]. During the aggregation process, the SP forwards
the user to the Proxy IdP; from where the user is forwarded
to other IdPs one after another. After each successful authen-
tication at the IdPs, the user returns back to the Proxy IdP
with an assertion consisting of the profile. The assertion is
then validated by the trusted IdP and the embedded attributes
are retrieved. In this manner, attributes from different IdPs
are aggregated into a combined set which is then released
to the SP. Based on the combined attributes, the SP takes an
authorisation decision.
B. IDENTITY RELAY (IR) MODEL
The IP model requires a strong trust assumption on the Proxy
IdP. To relax this assumption, Identity Relay model, a gen-
eralised case of the IP model, has been proposed [26], [27].
Like the IP model, the IR model also relies on a central IdP,
called the Relay IdP. However, the Relay IdP functions in
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a different way. In this model, upon a successful authentica-
tion at another IdP, the user returns back to the Relay IdP with
an encrypted assertion which has been encrypted by the other
IdP using the public key of the SP. Thus, the Relay IdP has no
knowledge of the attributes released by other IdPs. The Relay
IdP just combines these encrypted assertions into a single
assertion and forwards it to the SP. The SP, then, extracts,
decrypts and validates each single encrypted assertion and
finally retrieves attributes from each of them. Based on the
combined attributes, the SP takes an authorisation decision.
The proposed Hybrid model allows the aggregation and
release of attributes from different federated SAML IdPs to an
SP by leveraging a trusted third party called Hybrid IdP. The
architecture of the Hybrid model is illustrated in Figure 8.
The dotted area in the figure represents the Circle of Trust
(i.e. the federation) between two entities.
FIGURE 8. Architecture of hybrid model.
The Hybrid model essentially combines the capabilities of
both the Proxy and Relay IdP in a single setting to offer differ-
ent privacy levels while aggregating attributes from different
SAML IdPs. Assuming the role of the Proxy IdP, the Hybrid
IdP allows a user to aggregated attributes from other SAML
IdPs. To facilitate this, other third-party SAML IdPs (SAML
IdP1 and SAML IdP2 in Figure 8) must be federated with the
Hybrid IdP. In addition, the Hybrid IdP needs to be federated
with the SP (as illustrated in Figure 8).
On the other hand, when the Hybrid IdP assumes the role
of a Relay IdP, it will only receive encrypted assertions from
the other third-party SAML IdPs. In this way, Hybrid IdP will
have no knowledge on which attributes are released to the SP
by the other IdP and hence, provides a layer of privacy for the
user. To facilitate this, other SAML IdPs must be federated
with the SP so that they can create and release encrypted
assertions to the SP without exposing them to the Hybrid IdP.
This condition is visualised in Figure 8, encrypted assertions
can be released by SAML IdP1 to the SP as they belong to the
CoT whereas the SAML IdP2 cannot release such assertions
to the SP.
In [2], the authors have presented how such an architecture
has been designed and how a proof of concept has been
developed following a set of requirements and design choices.
In addition, they have illustrated two use-cases to explore
the suitability of the proposed model and analysed different
security and privacy issues. One crucial feature lacking in the
Hybrid model is that it cannot be used to aggregate attributes
from any other IdPs except SAML IdPs. With the emergence
of social networks, a lot of user attributes are stored in the
corresponding IdPs of different social networks. A mecha-
nism to aggregate attributes from these IdPs, hence, would
be beneficial and timely. This mechanism would provide an
additional layer of advantage if it could address the serious
privacy issues of attribute disclosure identified in Section III.
In this article, we aim to achieve these goals. In particular, our
motivation is two-fold:
• we seek to explore how we can extend the concept of the
Hybrid model for aggregating attributes from different
social networks and
• how it can be carried in a privacy-preserving fashion so
that we can rectify the problems and gaps identified in
Section III.
V. SOCIAL ANCHOR
In this section, we present Social Anchor, our proposed
privacy-friendly attribute aggregation system for social net-
works. Social Anchor is based on the ideas of the Hybrid
model of attribute aggregationwith the sole aim to address the
privacy issues identified in the previous section. In addition,
to accommodate different privacy requirements, we present
two different types of architectures. In the following,
we present a threat modelling process to identify different
security and privacy threats for Social Anchor (Section V-A),
formulate different functional, security and privacy require-
ments (Section V-B), describe the two architectures along
with their algorithms (Section V-C & Section V-D), dis-
cuss their implementation strategies (Section V-E) and
finally, analyse the issues of trust involving Social Anchor
(Section V-F).
A. THREAT MODELLING
Threat modelling is an integrated process of designing and
developing a secure system. A well-defined threat model
helps to identify threats on different assets of a secure system.
In order to tackle such threats, different mitigation strategies
need to be outlined by formulating different security and
privacy requirements [28]. In essence, a threat modelling
consists of the following steps [29], [30]:
(a) listing assets of the respective system,
(b) identifying possible threats for each of those assets and
(c) determining strategies to mitigate those threats.
An asset is the abstract or physical resource in a system
that needs to be protected from an adversary (attacker) [28].
It is the resource for which a threat exists and represents the
target of the adversary in the system. we have identified a few
assets for an IdentityManagement System (IMS) in [2]. Since
Social Anchor is also a part of an IMS, these assets are also
applicable to Social Anchor. The assets are discussed below.
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• Partial Identity of a user. In an Identity Management
system, we consider the partial identity (parIdentud ) of
a user u in a domain/system d as the core asset. This
is because the partial identity consisting of different
attributes represent a valuable commodity to any adver-
sary. It is to be noted that such a partial identity consists
of different attribute name-value pairs for that user in
that application domain as presented in Section II.
• Activities associated with a partial identity. In addi-
tion to the partial identity, activities associated with a
partial identity represents a valuable asset. The reason is
that an adversary can abuse the knowledge of such activ-
ities to profile users across different domains. Within the
scope of this article, if an attribute aggregation feature is
added to a third party, e.g. a social network, it can build a
profile of a user when the attribute aggregation is carried
out at its end which then can be abused in many ways.
Identifying Threats. A threat represents the capability of an
adversary to abuse an asset of a system so that she can invade
the security of the system or invade the privacy of a user [28].
We have identified several threats within the scope of Social
Anchor, which can be classified in two categories: security
threats and privacy threats and are presented below.
1) SECURITY THREATS
Security threats are closely related to the capability of an
attacker who intends to compromise the system’s architec-
ture. In order to better understand these threats, it is therefore
beneficial to model the capabilities of an adversary. The most
well-known and strongest adversary model used in analysing
communication protocols is theDolev-Yao (D-Y)model [31].
In this model, it is assumed that a D-Y adversary (attacker)
can fully access all communication channels and has the
capability to intercept all messages sent and received over
the specified channels. The attacker can also modify such
messages, only if the attacker has the correct cryptographic
key. That is, the attacker is incapable to break cryptographic
mechanisms.
In relation to the D-Y model, the identified threats are as
follows.
• Spoofing. An unauthenticated and unauthorised user
getting hold of an information regarding the partial iden-
tity of a valid user achieves the ability to impersonate as
the valid user.
• Tampering. Data while being transmitted is intercepted
and altered by an attacker with malicious intents.
2) PRIVACY THREATS
In the absence of any model that explores the capability of
an attacker in relation to privacy, we assume that privacy
threats mostly emerge from the lack of any privacy control
for any user. That is, to the user, the Service Provider can
be a potential attacker who tries to get as many attributes as
possible from the users with the malicious intents to abuse
them afterwards. Therefore, the goal of the user is to limit
this abuse by releasing only a minimum number of attributes
that are essential to access the requested service. Based on
this assumption, the identified threats are as follows.
• Selective disclosure. Users cannot choose appropriate
attributes that they want to release to a third party, e.g. a
service provider.
• Explicit consent. Users have no way to provide any
consent before their attributes are disclosed to service
providers.
• Lack of control. Users have little control on the way
attributes are released to the service providers.
• Aggregated profiling. Attributes aggregated by an
untrusted entity would enable it to profile any user in
a massive scale.
B. REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS
To minimise the identified threats, mitigation strategies must
be carefully planned and transformed into actions. One way
to achieve this is to transform them into requirements which
the system must fulfil as proposed in [28]. In [2], we have
already identified a set of different functional, security and
privacy requirements for the Hybrid model. Since the current
research is an extension of the Hybrid model, most of these
requirements apply here as well. That is why we omit most
of these requirements here for brevity and present only those
requirements needed to minimise the threats for aggregating
attributes within the setting of social networks.
1) FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS (FR)
Functional requirements ensure the core functionalities of a
system. The requirements are listed below.
• F1. The Hybrid IdP can interact with different SN IdPs
using their corresponding protocols.
• F2. The Hybrid IdP can validate any response received
from different SN IdPs and extract embedded attributes.
2) PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS (PR)
The privacy requirements presented below aim to tackle the
specific privacy threats identified above. The requirements
are listed below.
• P1. Users can select each attribute provided by the SN
IdPs before they are released to the SP. This requirement
is to undermine the selective disclosure threat.
• P2. Users can provide explicit consents before any
attribute is released to an SP. This requirement is to
undermine the explicit consent threat.
• P3. Users have the control to decide when attributes can
be exposed to the Hybrid IdP and when they need to be
masked from the Hybrid IdP. This is to deter the lack of
control threat.
• P4. Attributes are aggregated only by a trusted entity.
This requirement is leveraged to undermine the aggre-
gated profiling threat.
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FIGURE 9. Social anchor: Type 1 architecture.
3) SECURITY REQUIREMENTS (SR)
Similarly, the security requirements presented below aim to
tackle the security threats identified above. The requirements
are listed below.
• S1. There must be a secure user registration and authen-
tication mechanism in each SN IdP. Before accessing
her attributes and releasing those attributes to the Hybrid
IdP, a user must be authenticated.
• S2. The transmitted data between any two parties is
not disclosed to any unauthorised entity. S1 and S2 are
combinedly used to undermine the spoofing threat.
• S3. The transmitted data is not altered during transmis-
sion. This requirement is used to undermine the tamper-
ing threat.
C. ARCHITECTURE: TYPE 1
Social Anchor is a system for aggregating attributes from
different SN IdPs. It is based on the Hybrid model allowing
any user to release aggregated attributes to a SAML SP using
the Hybrid IdP. Its ultimate focus is to facilitate this provision
in a privacy-friendly way. Towards this aim, we present two
different architectures of Social Anchor to offer different
levels of privacy controls for any user. In this section we
present the first architecture (denoted as Type 1 architecture)
while the second architecture (denoted as Type 2 architecture)
is presented in the following section (Section V-D).
The Type 1 architecture of Social Anchor is illustrated
in Figure 9. This is analogous to the Hybrid model where
a Hybrid IdP takes the central stage and the SP is under the
sameCoT as theHybrid IdP, implying they belong to the same
federation. Additionally, the Hybrid IdP has been extended
with the Social Anchor capabilities to allow attribute aggre-
gation from multiple social networking websites. In Figure 9,
this is represented with SA attached to the Hybrid IdP. The
added capability enables a user to aggregate attributes in a
privacy-friendly manner from different social networks util-
ising the Hybrid IdP of Social Anchor in the Identity Prox-
ying (IP) mode. As identified earlier, the privacy-friendly
mechanism specifically aims to address the following gaps:
• the selective disclosure of attributes released from social
networks to a SAML SP.
• explicit consents for attributes released from social
networks.
To facilitate this, the Hybrid IdP in Social Anchor has been
modified with the following capabilities using an attribute
aggregation algorithm:
• Interactions with different SN IdPs in such a way that
they can release attributes to the Hybrid IdP in a single
session.
• An interface to aggregate attributes from different SN
IdPs in a single session.
The attribute aggregation algorithm is presented in
Algorithm 1 which can be divided in two phases: the setup
phase and the aggregation phase. In the setup phase, different
SN IdPs are added to a list in the Hybrid IdP (represented
as soruceList in Algorithm 1) in such way that they can
act as external IdPs and the authentication task can be del-
egated to them. In addition, the set of aggregated attributes
(Att − Aggu) is initialised as null. The core of the algorithm is
the aggregation phase in which a user can aggregate attributes
from the external IdPs. The steps in this process are captured
in the aggregate method in the algorithm. The method is
called with soruceList and Att − Aggu when the Hybrid IdP
receives a SAML authentication request (AuthnReq) from the
SP. Then, the Hybrid IdP displays the list of external IdPs
(line 19 in Algorithm 1) from which a user can repeatedly
select an IdP (not already been used) one after another.
During each iteration, the Hybrid IdP interacts with the
selected IdP using the respective protocol. Once a response
from the respective IdP is received, the Hybrid IdP vali-
dates the response and extracts the set of attributes released
from the IdP. This set is then aggregated to the already
aggregated set(s) of attributes (line 34 in Algorithm 1).
This process is repeated (line 35 in Algorithm 1) until the
user decides to end the aggregation process or attributes
from all external IdPs have been aggregated. The detailed
protocol flow utilising this architecture is illustrated
in Section VI.
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Algorithm 1 Attribute Aggregation Algorithm at
Hybrid IdP
1 Input: The request for attribute aggregation from an SP
2 Output: A SAML response to the requested SP
3 Start
4 Set Att − Aggu := null
5 Set
OAuthSource := {Facebook ∪ LinkedIn ∪ Twitter}
6 Set OpenIDSource :=
{Yahoo ∪ Google ∪ LiveJournal ∪ VeriSign}
7 Set soruceList := {OAuthSource ∪ OpenIDSource}
8 On receive (AuthnReq)
9 id req := AuthnReq.id req
10 id sp := AuthnReq.id sp
11 Att − Aggu = aggregate(soruceList ,Att − Aggu)
12 SAMLAssrtn := {Att − Aggu}K−1hyidp
13 SAMLResp := (id req.id sp.id idp.SAMLAssrtn)
14 send SAMLResp to SP
15 function aggregate(soruceList ,Att − Aggu)
16 if isEmpty(soruceList) then
17 return Att − Aggu
18 end
19 show ConsentPage(soruceList)
20 On receive (releaseAttribute)
21 return Att − Aggu
22 On receive (userChoice)
23 x := userChoice
24 if x ∈ OAuthSource then
25 initiate OAuth protocol using the respective
app
26 end
27 if x ∈ OpenIDSource then
28 initiate OpenID protocol
29 end
30 On receive (response)
31 validate response using the respective protocol
32 idp := response.idp
33 PROFILEuidp := response.PROFILEuidp
34 Att − Aggu := Att − Aggu ∪ PROFILEuidp
35 return aggregate(soruceList \ idp,Att − Aggu)
D. ARCHITECTURE: TYPE 2
One particular weakness of the Type 1 architecture of Social
Anchor is that the Hybrid IdP has an overarching control
over the attributes released from the external IdPs during the
aggregation process. This enables it to be in a position to
abuse the released attributes and hence, a user has to trust
the Hybrid IdP that it will not undermine her trust. One way
to tackle this is to introduce a corrective mechanism based
on the Identity Relay (IR) mode so that the Hybrid IdP has
no knowledge of what attributes are released from an IdP.
The Type 2 architecture of Social Anchor aims to introduce
this corrective mechanism. The architecture is illustrated
in Figure 10.
FIGURE 10. Social anchor: Type 2 architecture.
This architecture leverages two IdPs: Hybrid IdP and
Portable Personal IdP (PPIdP). A PPIdP is a special type
of IdP introduced in [32] which can be installed in any
smart-device of a user. It consists of a Personal Attribute
Store (PAS) with the required interfaces to add and store
attributes securely within those devices and release them to
an SP. In such, the PPIdP and any attributes stored within it
remain under the full control of the user. We have extended
the PPIdP with the functionalities of Social Anchor so that
it can aggregate attributes from different SN IdPs as pre-
sented in Section V-C. Furthermore, the Hybrid IdP has been
equipped with the IR mode of attribute aggregation. As per
the architecture, the SP needs to be federated with the Hybrid
IdP and PPIdP (no necessarily within the same federation),
as illustrated with notations CoT 1 and CoT 3 in Figure 10.
On the other hand, the Hybrid IdP and the PPIdP must belong
to the same federation (CoT 2 in Figure 10).
The aggregation algorithms used in these two IdPs are pre-
sented in Algorithm 2 and Algorithm 3. As before, the algo-
rithm in each IdP has two phases: setup and aggregation.
During the setup phase in Algorithm 2, the PPIdP is added
as an external IdP in Hybrid IdP and other SN IdPs are added
as external IdPs in PPIdP. In addition, the sets of aggregated
attributes in each IdP (Att − Agguhyidp and Att − Agguppidp) are
initialised as null. The aggregation in this architecture has two
phases. In the first phase, upon receiving a SAML authentica-
tion request, the Hybrid IdP delegates the authentication task
to the PPIdP by creating a new SAML authentication request.
Once the PPIdP receives the authentication request, it follows
the same aggregation procedure described in Section V-C
and illustrated in Algorithm 3. Once the aggregation is com-
plete at PPIdP, an encrypted SAML assertion, containing the
aggregated attributes, is created in such a way that only the
target SP can decrypt it. The encrypted assertion is embed-
ded into a regular SAML assertion as a special attribute.
VOLUME 8, 2020 61855
M. S. Ferdous et al.: Social Anchor: Privacy-Friendly Attribute Aggregation From SNs
Algorithm 2 Attribute Aggregation Algorithm at
Hybrid IdP
1 Input: The request for attribute aggregation from an SP
2 Output: A SAML response to the requested SP
3 Start
4 Set Att − Agguhyidp := null
5 Set soruceListhyidp := {PPIdP}
6 On receive (AuthnReq) at HyIdP
7 id req := AuthnReq.id req
8 id sp := AuthnReq.id sp
9 Att − Agguhyidp =
aggregateHyIDP(soruceListhyidp,Att − Agguhyidp)
10 SAMLAssrtn := {Att − Agguhyidp}K−1hyidp
11 SAMLResp := (id req.id sp.id idp.SAMLAssrtn)
12 send SAMLResp to SP
13 function aggregateHyIDP(soruceList ,Att − Aggu)
14 if isEmpty(soruceList) then
15 return Att − Aggu
16 end
17 show ConsentPage(soruceList)
18 On receive (releaseAttribute)
19 return Att − Aggu
20 On receive (userChoice)
21 x := userChoice
22 if x = PPIdP then
23 prepare AuthnReq for PPIdP and send it to
PPIdP
24 end
25 On receive (response)
26 validate response using the respective protocol
27 ppidp := response.idp
28 PROFILEuppidp := response.PROFILEuppidp
29 Att − Aggu := Att − Aggu ∪ PROFILEuppidp
30 return
aggregateHyIdP(soruceList \ idp,Att − Aggu)
Finally, a SAML response is created using the regular asser-
tion and returned to the Hybrid IdP where it is validated.
The Hybrid IdP then extracts the encrypted assertion and
treats it as a special attribute. Since the assertion is encrypted,
the Hybrid IdP has no knowledge of the sets of aggregated
attributes. The Hybrid IdP then follows the same procedure to
return the encrypted assertion as an attribute within a SAML
response to the SP. The SP extracts the encrypted assertion,
decrypts it, validates it and then finally extracts the sets of
aggregated attributes from different IdPs. A detailed protocol
flow utilising this architecture is presented in Section VI.
E. IMPLEMENTATION
We have developed a Proof of Concept implementing two
architectures of Social Anchor by extending the code-base of
the Hybrid model. In this section, we detail how the proof of
concept has been developed and implemented.
Algorithm 3 Attribute Aggregation Algorithm at PPIdP
1 Input: The request for attribute aggregation from the
Hybrid IdP
2 Output: A SAML response to the Hybrid IdP
3 Start
4 Set Att − Agguppidp := null
5 Set OAuthSourceppidp :=
{Facebook ∪ LinkedIn ∪ Twitter}
6 Set OpenIDSourceppidp :=
{Yahoo ∪ Google ∪ LiveJournal ∪ VeriSign}
7 Set soruceListppidp :=
{OAuthSourceppidp ∪ OpenIDSourceppidp}
8 On receive (AuthnReq) at PPIdP
9 id req := AuthnReq.id req
10 id sp := AuthnReq.id sp
11 Att − Agguppidp =
aggregatePPIdP(soruceList ,Att − Agguppidp)
12 SAMLAssrtn := {Att − Agguppidp}K−1ppidp
13 EncSAMLAssrtn := {SAMLAssrtn}Ksp
14 SAMLAssrtn′ := {EncSAMLAssrtn}K−1ppidp
15 SAMLResp := (id req.id sp.id idp.SAMLAssrtn′)
16 send SAMLResp to Hybrid IdP
17 function aggregatePPIdP(soruceList ,Att − Aggu)
18 if isEmpty(soruceList) then
19 return Att − Aggu
20 end
21 show ConsentPage(soruceList)
22 On receive (releaseAttribute)
23 return Att − Aggu
24 On receive (userChoice)
25 x := userChoice
26 if x ∈ OAuthSource then
27 initiate OAuth protocol using the respective
app
28 end
29 if x ∈ OpenIDSource then
30 initiate OpenID protocol
31 end
32 On receive (response)
33 validate response using the respective protocol
34 idp := response.idp
35 PROFILEuidp := response.PROFILEuidp
36 Att − Aggu := Att − Aggu ∪ PROFILEuidp
37 return
aggregatePPIdP(soruceList \ idp,Att − Aggu)
As in [2], SimpleSAMLphp has been used for the imple-
mentation of Hybrid IdP both in Type 1 and Type 2 archi-
tectures. The SimpleSAMLphp provides the Multiauth and
Consent modules to be used for the following two purposes:
(a) TheMultiauthmodule allows other SN IdPs to be added
as external IdPs so that it can delegate the authentication
task to them.
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(b) The Consent module enables the selective disclosure
and explicit consent of attributes at the Hybrid IdP.
Specifically, we have amended the code-base of the Mul-
tiauth module so that it can allow a user to initiate protocol
flows with different SN IdPs in a single session. Similarly,
we have extended the code-base of the Consent module so
that the aggregation process from different SN IdPs can be
completed and the aggregated attributes can be displayed to
the user within the same session.
For PPIdP, we have extended the PPIdP proof of concept,
developed as an Android App as presented in [32] by adding
the following capabilities for the Type 2 Social Anchor
architecture.
• Adding the attribute aggregation mechanism from dif-
ferent OpenID and OAuth based SN IdPs in a single
session, and
• Implementing amodule, similar to theMultiauthmodule
in SimpleSAMLphp, that will allow the PPIdP to interact
with an OpenID and OAuth based IdP and then delegate
any authentication task to such external IdPs.
• Implementing a consent module, similar to the Consent
module in SimpleSAMLphp, to act as the interface for
attribute aggregation and to enable the selective disclo-
sure of attributes within PPIdP.
Also, in the previous proof of concept of the Hybrid model,
the Hybrid IdP would provide a user with the option to
toggle between IP and IR mode. However, in the current
implementation we have made amendments in such a way
that the IR mode is automatically selected when the Hybrid
IdP delegates the authentication task to the PPIdP. To enable
this, the Hybrid IdP just passes on the reference of the
SP (its entity ID), via a hidden field, in the authentication
request.
In addition, we have kept the following features of Hybrid
model as presented in [2]:
• The same data structure, a list of lists, has been utilised
to represent the aggregated data in both architectures.
• The modified simlpeSAMLphp codebase so that it can
handle such data structure both in the Hybrid IdP and a
SAML SP.
For this implementation, seven external IdPs have been
added to the Hybrid IdP for the Type 1 architecture and to
the PPIdP for the Type 2 architecture. The added IdPs are:
Yahoo, Google, LiveJournal, VeriSign, Facebook, LinkedIn
and Twitter. Among them, the former four represent OpenID
providers and the latter three are OAuth IdPs.
Different deployment strategies have been sought for creat-
ing the federations among different entities in Social Anchor.
The SAML SP has been federated with the Hybrid IdP in a
traditional way by exchanging their corresponding metadata
offline for both architectures. On the other hand, PPIdP has
been added as an authentication source with the Hybrid IdP
by creating a federation among them in a dynamic fashion as
presented in [32], [33], [35].
F. TRUST ANALYSIS
The issue of trust is a fundamental concept in SAML as
different entities within the SAMLCircle of Trust (CoT) need
to trust each other inside the federation. The integration of
non-SAML social IdPs with the SAML IdP in Social Anchor
influences this notion of trust. Hence, it is crucial to analyse
the trust issues between different entities in Social Anchor.
Towards this aim, we utilise the mathematical model
of trust for FIM introduced in [36]. According to this
model, trust is of two types: Direct Trust (DT) and Indirect
Trust (IT) [37]. A direct trust implies a direct trust relation-
ship between the entities based on some experiences and
evidences. On the other hand, the indirect trust, also known
as Transitive Trust, represents an indirect trust relationship
between two entities which have been established using a
referral from one or more intermediate third parties. The
notation T is used to denote the set of trust types. Therefore,
T = {DT ⋃UT }.
Every trust relationship is accompanied by a scope which
signifies the specific purpose in which the relationship makes
sense. The trust strength represents the degree (level) of trust
a trustor has over a trustee. There might be different trust
scopes in different scenarios, however, for Social Anchor,
the set of trust scopes, denoted with S, consists of only one
scope denoted with FEDwhich implies that the scope is valid
within a federated domain. That is, S is a singleton set with
S = {FED}.
One important characteristic of trust is that it exhibits the
transitivity property [38]: if an entity A trusts another entity B
in a scope and B trust another entity Cwithin the same scope,
a trust relation can be derived between A and C.
Trust in a dynamic federation is modelled using three
types [33]. These three types with their respective trust
strength is discussed below.
• Entities (IdPs and SPs) in a traditional SAML feder-
ation are regarded as Fully Trusted as they trust each
other under their contractual conditions. Here, the trust
strength is denoted with FT .
• SPs added dynamically to an IdP inside the federation in
a dynamic fashion under some conditions without any
legal contract are regarded as Semi-trusted to the IdP.
Here, the trust strength is denoted with ST .
• Non-SAML SN IdPs are regarded as Untrusted entities
to a SAML IdP (e.g. Hybrid IdP and PPIdP). Here,
the trust strength is denoted with UT .
Among these, UT has the lowest trust strength implying
that a trustor does not trust a trustee at all. On the other hand,
FT implies the highest strength when the trustor and trustee
are part of a traditional federation. Thus, the ranking of trust
strengths is:
UT < ST < FT .
To indicate an entity e1 ∈ Ef (the trustor) has t ∈ T
trust over an entity e2 ∈ Ef (the trustee) with a trust scope
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FIGURE 11. Trust relationship between a non-SAML IdP and SP.
(signifies the specific purpose in which a trust relationship
is valid) of s ∈ S and the trust strength (signifies the level
of trust a trustor has over a trustee) of v in a federation f ,
the following notation is used:
e1
t : s−−−−−→
v
e2
Next, we can model the required trust relationships
between different entities in Type 1 architecture in the fol-
lowing manner:
• Between Hybrid IdP (denoted with HyIdP) and SP:
HyIdP
DT : FED←−−−−−−−−−→
FT
SP
• Between a non-SAML SN IdP (denoted as idpsn) and
Hybrid IdP:
HyIdP
DT : FED−−−−−−−−−−→
UT
idpsn
• Between a non-SAML SN IdP and the SP, equation
as shown at the bottom of this page. This implies that
the SP would have an indirect trust to any SN IdP
which is based on the trust transitivity property. The trust
strength is calculated based on the trust rules presented
in [36] which essentially state that the calculated trust
must assume the lowest value within the trust transitivity
chain. In this case, between FT and UT , the trust rules
will calculateUT as the trust strength as it has the lowest
trust strength between these two.
Similarly, we can model the required trust relationships
between different entities in Type 2 architecture in the fol-
lowing manner:
• Between Hybrid IdP, PPIdP and SP:
– Between the SP and Hybrid IdP:
SP
DT : FED←−−−−−−−−−→
HT
HyIdP
– Between the Hybrid IdP and PPIdP:
HyIdP
DT : FED−−−−−−−−−−→
ST
PPIdP
– Between the SP and PPIdP:
SP
DT : FED−−−−−−−−−−→
ST
PPIdP
• Between a non-SAML SN IdP and PPIdP:
PPIdP
DT : FED−−−−−−−−−−→
UT
idpsn
• The relationship between a non-SAML SN IdP and the
SP is illustrated in Figure 11.
VI. PROTOCOL FLOW
In the following, we present the protocol flows utilising the
two architectures of Social Anchor. The first flow is based
on the Type 1 architecture illustrating the steps for attribute
aggregation from different SN IdPs using the Hybrid IdP.
On the other hand, the second flow is based on the Type 2
architecture showcasing the steps for the same attribute
aggregation process using the Hybrid IdP and PPIdP which
is more privacy-friendly as discussed above.
A. TYPE 1
In the first use-case, we illustrate the simplest form of
attribute aggregation using Social Anchor where a user needs
to access a service provided by a SAML SP after releas-
ing attributes from several non-SAML IdPs. To illustrate
this use-case, let us consider this situation where a staff of
a university would like apply for another position in the
same university via their career portal (the service provider).
During her previous employment period, the user completed
some certification courses in different social networks such
as LinkedIn and Google (e.g. Google Certification) which
she would like to submit during her application to the ser-
vice provider. This scenario is motivated from the use-case
presented in [15] where a user accesses services from an
organisation upon releasing attributes from a single social IdP.
We have extended their use-case to include attribute aggre-
gation from multiple social IdPs in a single session. Within
this setting, it is assumed that the university has integrated
[
SP
DT : FED←−−−−−−−−−→
FT
HyIdP
][
HyIdP
DT : FED−−−−−−−−−−→
UT
idpsn
]
[
SP
IT : FED−−−−−−−−−−→
UT
idpsn
]
61858 VOLUME 8, 2020
M. S. Ferdous et al.: Social Anchor: Privacy-Friendly Attribute Aggregation From SNs
Social Anchor with their central IdP which is acting as the
Hybrid IdP. That is, the SP (the career portal) is deployed
using the modified SimpleSAMLphp as presented in [2] and
is federated with their IdP in a traditional way by exchanging
their corresponding metadata. Other non-SAML IdPs also
have been added to the Social Anchor as per the method
described in Section V-E. This means that for OpenID IdPs,
necessary endpoints have been set up at the Hybrid IdP and
for OAuth IdPs, an app is installed at the Authorization
Server (AS) to facilitate the interaction between the Hybrid
IdP and OAuth IdP.
With this setup, the protocol flow for the first use-case is
illustrated in Figure 12 and is described below:
i A user visits the SP to access one of its services. The
user clicks the respective service and is forwarded to the
WAYF (Where Are You From) Page of the SP to choose
an IdP. The user chooses the Hybrid IdP.
ii The SP reads the required attribute(s) for the requested
service from the configuration file. These attributes are
embedded inside a SAML authentication request with
which the user is redirected to the Hybrid IdP.
iii The consent form at the Hybrid IdP shows the list of
attributes along with their respective IdPs to indicate to
the user the attributes that need to be aggregated from
different SN IdPs (line 19 in Algorithm 1).
iv The user initiates the attribute aggregation function
by clicking the Aggregate More Attributes button. The
Hybrid IdP creates a session to keep track of the pre-
vious attributes and then forwards the user to the IdP
selection page of the Hybrid IdP. This page contains
the list of those SN IdPs from where the user has not
aggregated attributes in the current session.
v The user chooses one SN IdP (line 22 in Algorithm 1)
and based on the user’s selection, the respective pro-
tocol is initiated. For example, if the user chooses an
OAuth-based IdP (line 23 in Algorithm 1), she is for-
warded to the respective IdP following the OAuth pro-
tocol. Similarly, if the user chooses OpenID (line 27 in
Algorithm 1), a HTML form is shown to the user to
input the user’s OpenID. Once the OpenID is provided
and the Login button is clicked, the usual OpenID pro-
tocol starts and the user is forwarded to the OpenID
provider.
vi The user is authenticated at the respective IdP. Then, she
releases the attributes within a response to the Hybrid
IdP using their respective protocol.
vii The Hybrid IdP validates the response using their cor-
responding mechanisms (line 31 in Algorithm 1). Then,
the attributes are extracted from the response and the
previously aggregated attributes are retrieved using the
session. The two sets of attributes are then merged
(line 34 in Algorithm 1) and are shown to the user
by grouping them based on the IdP in the consent
form.
viii The requested attributes from the SP are shown on the
consent form for the user to determine if she needs to
aggregate more attributes from other SN IdPs. If so,
the steps iv-vii can be repeated.
ix Once the required attributes have been aggregated, she
decides to select and release those attributes. Based
on her selection, the attributes from each SN IdP are
wrapped inside a SAML assertion which is then embed-
ded inside a SAML response and is sent back to the SP
(line 14 in Algorithm 1).
x Upon receiving the response, the SP validates the asser-
tion and retrieves the set of attributes from each SN IdP.
The SP then can take authorisation decisions based on
those attributes.
B. TYPE 2
In the second use-case, we illustrate the applicability of
the Type 2 Architecture of Social Anchor to address
the privacy-invasive nature in the Type 1 Architecture: the
Hybrid IdP has the ultimate control and knowledge of the
user’s attributes released from different SN IdPs. Following
our university scenario as presented in Section VI-A, let
us consider the scenario when the user does not wish to
expose the aggregated attributes to the Hybrid IdP. Instead,
the user wants the aggregated attributes to be released to the
SP (the career portal), via the Hybrid IdP, in such a way
that the Hybrid IdP would have no knowledge regarding
the aggregated attributes. The Type 2 Architecture would
enable the user to achieve this goal by allowing her to
aggregate attributes using Social Anchor within a PPIdP
so that users have the ultimate control over the aggregated
attributes.
Towards this aim, during the setup phase, the PPIdP has
been equipped with the Social Anchor feature by adding
different non-SAML IdPs as authentication sources, similar
to the Hybrid IdP in the first use-case. Then, the PPIdP has
been installed within a smart mobile device of a user and then
is federated with the Hybrid IdP and SP using the mechanism
of Dynamic SAML as presented in [33]. In addition, as in the
first use-case, the SP has been deployed using the modified
SimpleSAMLphp and has been federated with the Hybrid IdP
of Social Anchor in a traditional way by exchanging their
corresponding metadata. Finally, the Hybrid IdP has been
equipped with an extended IR (Identity Relay) capability as
discussed previously.
With this setup, the protocol flow for the second use-case
is illustrated in Figure 13 and is described below. For brevity,
we have omitted the first three steps which are similar to the
ones illustrated in the first use-case.
i The user wishes to aggregate attributes from non-SAML
IdPs without revealing them to the Hybrid IdP.
ii The user is forwarded to the IdP selection page of the
Hybrid IdP, as before (line 17 in Algorithm 2), after
creating a session to keep track of the previously aggre-
gated attributes. However, this time the page shows only
the PPIdP.
iii When the user chooses the PPIdP, a SAML authen-
tication request with a special attribute called
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FIGURE 12. Protocol flow for Use-case 1.
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FIGURE 13. Protocol flow for Use-case 2.
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FIGURE 14. Consent form at the PPIdP.
FIGURE 15. Available IdPs at the PPIdP.
EmbedAssertion is forwarded to the PPIdP (line 23 in
Algorithm 2). This special attribute is used to indicate
that the receiving IdP is requesting an encrypted asser-
tion to be returned.
iv The PPIdP notes the EmbedAssertion attribute in the
authentication request and the entity ID of the SP is
retrieved and stored in a session variable.
v The user is authenticated at the PPIdP and then the
consent form containing attributes stored at this IdP are
shown to the user (Figure 14). The form has a Aggregate
Attributes button which the user can click to initiate the
attribute aggregation process.
vi Assuming the user clicks the Aggregate Attributes but-
ton, a new page with a list of SN IdPs is shown to the
user (Figure 15, line 21 in Algorithm 3). The current
implementation of the PPIdP allows the user to aggre-
gate attributes from Twitter, Google, OpenID, LinkedIn
and Facebook.
vii The user chooses one of the IdPs (lines 24-31 in
Algorithm 3) and she is forwarded to the corresponding
IdP where she is authenticated. Then, she comes back
to the PPIdP with attributes as discussed in the first
use-case.
viii The user can repeat steps v-vii to aggregate more
attributes from other IdPs. After aggregating attributes
from multiple IdPs (line 36 in Algorithm 3), the screen-
shot of the consent form at the PPIdP is given
in Figure 16.
ix The user chooses the attributes that she wants to release
and clicks the Submit button. The PPIdP utilises the
FIGURE 16. Aggregated attributes at the PPIdP.
SP entity ID retrieved from the SAML authentication
request. This entity ID is used to retrieve the public
key of SP (KSP) from its metadata repository. The pub-
lic key is then used to create an encrypted assertion
(line 12-13 in Algorithm 3) for the SP using the selected
attributes.
x The encrypted assertion is then added as a special
attribute called encryptedAssertion and attached within
a a regular unencrypted SAML assertion. The PPIdP
then sends the regular assertion back to the Hybrid IdP
via a SAML response (lines 16 in Algorithm 3).
xi Upon receiving the regular assertion, it is validated by
the Hybrid IdP. Then, the encryptedAssertion attribute
is retrieved and shown on the consent page in a
specific way.
xii When the user chooses the encrypted assertion and
clicks the Release attributes to SP button, a SAML
assertion containing the encryptedAssertion attribute is
created which is then sent back to the SP (lines 10-12
in Algorithm 2).
xiii The assertion is validated by the SP. Then, the embed-
ded encryptedAssertion attribute is retrieved and is
treated in a special way. The encrypted assertion is at
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first decrypted and then validated. Afterwards, all the
attributes aggregated at the PPIdP are retrieved. Then,
the SP can take an authorisation decision which we do
not elaborate any further.
In this way, a user can aggregate attributes using Social
Anchor at PPIdP in a privacy-friendly way. The user has the
ultimate control on how the attributes are aggregated and the
Type 2 architecture ensures that Hybrid IdP has no knowledge
whatsoever regarding which attributes are released to the SP.
VII. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss different aspects of Social Anchor.
Specifically, we analyse how Social Anchor has satisfied
different requirements (Section VII-A). During the security
analysis, we provide a formal analysis of Social Anchor
protocols using AVISPA. Then, we present a comparative
performance analysis between a traditional federation and
Social Anchor (Section VII-B). Finally, we explore the
advantages of Social Anchor and the current limitations it
has (Section VII-C).
A. FUNCTIONAL, SECURITY & PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In the following, we explore how Social Anchor satisfies
different functional, privacy and security requirements.
1) FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS
The Social Anchor deployed in the Hybrid IdP and the PPIdP
enables these IdPs to interact with different SN IdPs util-
ising the underlying OpenID and OAuth protocols, thereby
satisfying the F1 requirement. Similarly, Social Anchor also
enables both the Hybrid IdP and PPIdP to validate any
security token or response received from different SN IdPs
and then extract attributes released by them. In this way,
the F2 requirement is also satisfied.
2) PRIVACY ANALYSIS
Social Anchor deployed both in the Hybrid IdP and PPIdP
enables a user to select each single attribute from any SN
IdP before they are released to the SP. In addition, a user
must provide her explicit consent, by selecting the attributes
to be released and by clicking the Submit button within the
consent form, to release any attribute to the SP. Both these
features enable Social Anchor to satisfy requirements P1 and
P2. Furthermore, the user can choose between Architecture
type 1 and Architecture type 2 to control when attributes
can or cannot be exposed to the Hybrid IdP. This satisfies
the requirement P3. Finally, the attributes are aggregated only
at the Hybrid IdP and PPIdP, depending on the architecture
being used. Both these IdPs are highly trusted from the per-
spective of a user and hence, the requirement P4 is satisfied
as well.
3) SECURITY ANALYSIS
Each SN IdP utilised in our implementation have strict secure
procedures during the registration as well as authentication
process. These procedures are rigorously implemented as
the reliability and reputation of online services provided by
such IdPs heavily rely on such procedures. This leads us to
conclude that the requirement S1 is satisfied.
Our implementation heavily relies on HTTPS communica-
tion channels to ensure that any transmitted data is not altered
during transmission and is not disclosed to any unauthorised
third party, thereby satisfying requirements S2 and S3.
We have utilised standardised protocols in our implementa-
tion while engaging in interactions between different entities.
This is to ensure that the security of the system is well pre-
served. Even so, Social Anchor employs complex interactions
with many components from different systems. It is well
understood that the security of any such complex systems is
difficult to ensure. One prominent approach to guarantee the
security of any such complex system is to formally analyse
its security. Towards this aim, we have formally analysed
the security of Social Anchor using a tool called AVISPA
(Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications).
AVISPA [3], [4] is utilised for formal modelling and veri-
fication of security protocols with the aim of determining if
certain security properties are satisfied. The security protocol
in AVISPA is modelled using the High-Level Protocol Spec-
ification Language (HLPSL) which is based on Lamport’s
Temporal Logics of Actions (TLA) [39]. In HLPSL, different
entities of a security protocol are modelled using roles and
their interactions using transitions along with a set of secu-
rity goals under the knowledge assumption of a Dolev-Yao
attacker model as described in Section V-A.
In practice, protocol formalisation using AVISPA is a two
step process: specification and verification.
• The first step is the specification where the protocol is
specified in a formal way. This also is a two step process:
– Specifying the protocol in Alice-Bob (A-B) nota-
tion, which provides a clear illustration of which
entities are involved and what messages are
exchanged between them.
– Modelling the protocol and its security goals in
HLPSL and saving the formalisation within an
HLPSL file.
• The last step is the verification of the protocol which
is carried out by executing the AVISPA tool with the
saved HLPSL file to determine if the security goals
are satisfied. For this, the HLPSL file is passed into
a translator which translates the HLPSL format into a
low level language called the Intermediate Format (IF).
The translated IF is then passed into one of the four
back-ends that AVISPA currently supports: the On-the-
fly Model-Checker (OFMC), Constraint-Logic-based
Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), the SAT-based Model-
Checker (SATMC) and the Tree Automata based on
Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security
Protocols (TA4SP). The back-end checks if the security
goals are satisfied and outputs accordingly.
HLPSL currently supports two different types of security
goals: secrecy and authentication. Here, secrecy refers to the
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FIGURE 17. AVISPA result for type 1 architecture.
goal asserting if a certain value should be kept secret between
only two entities and corresponds to our S1 (spoofing) secu-
rity requirement. Conversely, the authentication goal checks
if two entities are properly authenticated to each other and
agree on the required data during their interaction. In such,
this corresponds to S2 (tampering) requirement.
Our formal analysis of Social Anchor is based on the work
presented in [40] where three well-known Identity Manage-
ment protocols - SAML, OpenID and OAuth - have been
formally analysed using AVISPA. We have adopted their
analysis and extended it as required for Social Anchor.
As supplementary materials, we have attached the Alice-
Bob notations for Social Anchor Type 1 and Type 2 archi-
tectures in two files, Listing 1.txt and Listing 2.txt respec-
tively. In addition, the corresponding HLPSL files for Social
Anchor Type 1 and Type 2 architectures are provided in
AttAgg.hlpsl and PPIdPAttAgg.hlpsl files respectively. Each
specified role in each HLPSL file essentially captures the
interactions presented in the respective Alice-Bob notation.
The security goals within each HLPSL file signify different
security requirements for different interactions. The security
of protocol can be verified by saving each of the presented
HLPSL formalisation in an HLPSL file and executing the
AVISPA tool with the file and the ofmc back-end. The ver-
ification results, presented in Figure 17 and Figure 18, will
indicate that the modelled protocols are secure against the
specified security goals. This essentially verifies that all secu-
rity goals, encoding the security requirements, are satisfied by
Social Anchor.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
It is crucial that the performance of any newly proposed
system is analysed using different experiments to show
its suitability. There are different metrics such as latency
FIGURE 18. AVISPA result for type 2 architecture.
(response time), throughput and so on, which can be used to
measure the performance of any system. Among all these,
we consider latency/response time to be the most crucial
metric for Social Anchor. This is because throughput mostly
measures the number of requests a system can handle per unit
time. Since Social Anchor is developed and deployed using
web technologies such as Apache and PHP and these tech-
nologies can provide substantial throughput, this metric has
not been used to analyse the performance of Social Anchor.
There are different interpretations for the latency, therefore,
it is important to outline what they mean in the context of
Social Anchor. In our experiment, latency defines the elapsed
time between a user request is submitted to the system and a
response is generated by the system.
As the first step, we have carried out some base test cases so
as to collect base performance metrics and use them for sub-
sequent analysis. Next, we explain the experiment setup and
the procedure for this base case which has utilised a simple
SAML setup in which a single SAML federation consisting
of an IdP and an SP has been created using SimpleSAMLphp.
The experiment has been carried out within a simulated
environment where multiple users have been simulated to
use the base test case in an automatic fashion and in the
background, the required metrics have been collected. After
that, the metrics have been analysed and different graphs
are generated to investigate the performance of this base test
case. The simulated environment consists of a desktop com-
puter with a Core-i5 machine and 8GB RAM connected to a
100Mbps LAN.
User interactions have been simulated with Selenium [41],
a widely-used load testing tools for web services, where each
interaction involves submitting a request to access the SP.
This request initiates a SAML authentication request to the
IdP where the authentication is carried out automatically.
After this, a few pre-defined attributes are automatically
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selected to create the corresponding SAML response, which
is sent back to the SP. After validating the response,
the requested page is returned to the requesting Selenium
thread. Finally, a request to log the user out has been submit-
ted. This base case experiment consists of ten rounds where
in each round we have gradually increased the number of
simulated users. For example, the first round consists of one
simulated user, the second round consists of two simulated
users and so on. Again, each simulated user has been con-
figured to generate five consecutive requests, generating five
interactions described previously. For each of these inter-
actions, we have measured the elapsed time, between the
request submitted and the response received, both for login
and logout scenarios at the service provider. The measured
elapsed time acts as the base performance metrics.
FIGURE 19. Login latency.
FIGURE 20. Logout latency.
Next, we present several graphs analysing the collected
metrics. The first two graphs, Figure 19 and Figure 20,
present the elapsed time for login and logout respectively for
five simultaneous users in the fifth round. It is clear from
the graphs that there is a specific pattern both for logins and
logouts. For example, the first requests (denoted with Login 1
in Figure 19) have incurred the maximum delay (around
3 sec) for all users where other subsequent requests (denoted
with Login 2, Login 3, Login 4 and Login 5 in Figure 19)
have taken less than half a second. This is because the first
request is to initiate the SAML authentication flow where all
the subsequent requests have taken advantage of the Single
Sign On facility of SAML, thereby reducing the elapsed
time significantly. However, there have been little differences
in elapsed time among different logout requests (denoted
with Logout 1, Logout 2, Logout 3, Logout 4 and Logout 5
in Figure 20) for all users. Login and logout graphs for other
rounds have exhibited similar patterns and have been skipped
for brevity.
In Figure 21 and Figure 22, we have plotted three differ-
ent graphs with respect to different simultaneous accesses
by users in different rounds. For example, 1 User denotes
the first round with only a single user submitting the
(login/logout) request using Selenium, 2 Users denotes
the second round with two simultaneous users submitting the
requests and so on. Three different graphs plotted in Figure 21
and Figure 22 represent the maximum, minimum and average
latency for logins and logouts respectively for different simul-
taneous access. From Figure 21, it is clear that the maximum
login time (time representing the elapsed period for the first
request) increases with the number of simultaneous access in
different rounds: 0.99s for a single user (in the first round),
around 3s for five users (in the fifth round) and 4.85s for
10 users (in the tenth round). This is because of how Selenium
simulates multiple users at the same time, has nothing to do
with the performance of SimpleSAMLphp. Selenium uses
threads to imitate simultaneous users and as the number of
threads increases, Selenium itself starts to take longer time
to switch between the generated threads which ultimately
has caused the elapsed time to increase. However, the min-
imum login time remain mostly same for all simultaneous
access in different rounds. Therefore, the maximum login
time mostly controls the average login time as demonstrated
in Figure 21.
On the other hand, Figure 22 of logout latency clearly
illustrates a similar trend like login latency, where the latency
increases as the number of simultaneous users increases.
However, the deviations among the elapsed time in three
different graphs here are much less in comparison to their
login counterparts. For example, the maximum andminimum
latencies in the first round are .27s and .12s respectively,
in the fifth round are .32s and .22s respectively and in the
tenth round are .38s and .29s respectively.
TABLE 3. Social anchor test cases for login.
Next, we analyse the impact of latency of Social Anchor in
an abstract fashion. For this we have considered five different
test cases as presented in Table 3 where SA and Aggr imply
Social Anchor and Aggregation respectively. Here, Case 1
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FIGURE 21. Login latency for different test cases.
FIGURE 22. Logout latency for different test cases.
represents the base test case involving a traditional SAML
federation as described previously. Case 2 and 3 represent the
test cases for releasing attributes from Google and Facebook
respectively using the Social Anchor Type 1 architecture,
without aggregating attributes from multiple IdPs. On the
other hand, Case 4 and 5 represent the attribute aggregation
test cases involving Type 1 and Type 2 architectures of Social
Anchor respectively. The third column in each test case is
their corresponding representation of latency. In the follow-
ing, we analyse the relation between T1 to T5.
AS, T1 represents the login latency for a simple federation
setup as explained before and hence T1 = 0.99s as per
Figure 21 for User 1. However, unlike T1, the latencies
denoted by T2 to T3 have not been collected empirically
with an experiment. This is because of two reasons explained
below:
• In such empirical experiments, the latency will be
highly dependent on how quickly/slowly a user selects/
aggregates attributes from other SN IdPs. Different users
have different cognitive understanding and hence, might
take different times to select/aggregate attributes. The
more time a user takes, the higher the latency becomes
and thus, it might have a detrimental effect on the latency
of Social Anchor.
• The respective test cases (Case 2 to Case 4) would
require to interact with SN IdPs such as Google and
Facebook. Thus, the corresponding latencies (T2 to T4)
will highly depend on the interaction time with these
entities which itself will vary depending on the band-
width of the access network from where a user accesses
such services. An empirical experiment will thus be
irrelevant.
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Continuing with the analysis, T2 and T3 will be certainly
higher than T1. This is because the simple federation was
setup in the same local computer from where the experi-
ment was carried out. On the other hand, T2 and T3 would
require to interact with Google and Facebook respectively for
releasing attributes. However, the comparison between T2
and T3 will be meaningful only after an empirical experi-
ment. Therefore, we relate them in this manner: T2 ' T3.
Similarly, T4 and T5 will be higher than T1,T2 and T3.
This is because T4 and T5 will be dependant of the number
and type of IdPs from where the attributes are aggregated.
Like before, we model the relationship between T4 and T5 as
T4 ' T5 because the same reasons explained before. Finally,
the relation between all latencies can be represented in the
following way:
T1 < (T2 ' T3) < (T4 ' T5)
It is to be noted that we have excluded the Logout analysis
for Social Anchor. This is because the logout procedure in
Social Anchor, like any traditional SAML federation, sub-
mits a SAML logout request to the Hybrid IdP and hence,
the latency will be similar to that of any traditional SAML
federation which has been already presented in Figure 22.
C. ADVANTAGES & LIMITATIONS
Social Anchor provides a number of advantages which are
summarised below:
• It is the first system to enable a user to aggregate
attributes from multiple SN IdPs in a privacy-friendly
fashion and then release them to a SAML SP in a single
session. This opens up the door of opportunities for
providing innovative online service which have not been
possible until now.
• It provides an overlay of privacy protection for a user
while aggregating attributes from different SN IdPs.
As our findings suggest, almost all of the chosen SN
IdPs do not have any facility for the selective disclosure
of attributes while attributes are released. To address
this, Social Anchor allows a user, via its consent mod-
ules in the Hybrid IdP and PPIdP, to choose attributes
and provide explicit consent before they are released
to an SP.
• Social Anchor empowers a user by enabling her to exer-
cise the ultimate control on how attributes from different
SN IdPs are released. This is achieved by allowing the
user to choose the IdP where the aggregation can take
place: either at the Hybrid IdP or at the PPIdP. In par-
ticular, by allowing the user to aggregate attributes at
the PPIdP and then release to the SP via the Hybrid IdP,
Social Anchor ensures that the aggregation takes place
at the most trusted entity which is under the full control
of the user.
• Another important feature of Social Anchor is its support
for security. The whole flow is carried out under HTTPS
channels and is based on standardised security proto-
cols. This ensures that the attribute aggregation takes
place in a secure fashion. Our formal analysis using
AVISPA testifies the security goals of Social Anchor.
Social Anchor, unfortunately, suffers from a few limita-
tions which are summarised below:
• The number of interactions for aggregating attributes
from multiple SN IdPs can be quite high. In a traditional
setting where a user releases attributes only from one
single IdP to an SP the interaction is quite straightfor-
ward: just between a user, the IdP and SP. However,
an attribute aggregation process naturally requires much
more interactions involving different entities. This
might raise questions regarding the usability of Social
Anchor. In future, we would like to investigate this
issue.
• The Type 2 Architecture of Social Anchor is reliant on
PPIdP. Since, in its current form, the PPIdP can only
be accessed from a mobile device where it is installed,
the aggregation process can be initiated only from a
browser of the corresponding mobile device. In future,
we would like to investigate how this limitation can
be addressed by utilising a smart-contract supporting
blockchain system where the smart-contract would act
like a PPIdP.
VIII. RELATED WORK
In this section, we explore some of the previous related
works on attribute aggregation within the domain of feder-
ated identity. We also analyse their scopes with respect to
Social Anchor and compare them using six criteria: federated
setting, social network, attribute aggregation, selective dis-
closure, explicit consent and formal verification. These six
criteria, essentially, represent the core themes of the present
work: attribute aggregation in a federated setting from dif-
ferent social networks with privacy features of selective dis-
closure and explicit consent and a formal verification of its
protocols.
The initial concept of attribute aggregation from differ-
ent identity providers within a federated identity domain
was introduced by Klingenstein et al. in [26]. The authors
also presented the theoretical conceptualisation of differ-
ent (Type 1) attribute aggregation models within a feder-
ated identity domain by different entities, such as identity
providers, service providers and so on. However, the con-
cept of aggregating attributes from different social networks
within a federated domain was not explored. The authors also
did not explore how attributes could be selectively disclosed
with explicit consent during the attribute aggregation pro-
cess. There was no implementation of any of the proposed
models and hence, the formal analysis of protocols was not
considered.
The first implementation of attribute aggregation in a
federated identity setting was presented in [42] where a
novel user-centric model of (Type 1) attribute aggregation
was introduced. The users, using that model, can initiate
and control the attribute aggregation process from different
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TABLE 4. Comparison of existing works with social anchor.
federated IdPs. However, their implementation did not
allow to aggregate attributes from different social networks.
Besides, the concept of selective disclosure and formal veri-
fication of protocols were absent.
In [43], Chadwick et al. presented a visual way of (Type 1)
attribute aggregation from different federated IdPs in a fed-
erated setting. For this, the authors utilised the concept of
Windows CardSpace [44]. CardSpace provides a logical rep-
resentation of the concept of plastic cards (e.g credit/debit
cards, loyalty cards, ID cards and so on) that are widely
used to store different attributes in the physical world. The
core idea in CardSpace is to represent attributes in different
identity providers using logical cards where each card con-
tains the attributes from the corresponding identity provider.
Even though the concept was no longer supported by Win-
dows, the authors utilised this notion to create a visual
representation of attribute aggregation process supporting
selective disclosure and explicit consent. However, their pro-
posal does not allow to aggregate attributes from social net-
works and there was no formal verification of their presented
protocols.
The authors in [15] presented a novel mechanism to
link and utilise social network attributes with organisational
identities within a federated setting. Their method enables
the users to access restricted resources of federated service
providers using their social network attributes with explicit
consents. However, they did not explore the concept of
attribute aggregation with selective disclosure and did not
formally verify their security protocols.
Ferdous et al. (in [10]) analysed different (Type 1) attribute
aggregation models against a set of functional, security, pri-
vacy and trust requirements in a federated identity setting.
Using these requirements, the authors compared each of these
models to identify their relative strengths and weaknesses.
This was a mere theoretical analysis with no implementation
of any of the presented models and thus, does not meet the
most of the selected criteria (see below).
In our previous work [2], we presented a hybrid model of
(Type 1 and 2) attribute aggregation from SAML IdPs within
a federation with explicit consent and selective disclosure.
The current work, as mentioned earlier, is an extension of this
work and has modified the hybrid model to enable Type 1 and
Type 2 attribute aggregation from different social networks.
Also, there was no formal verification the corresponding
security protocols in [2].
In addition to the federated identity domain, the concept of
attribute aggregation was also considered in other application
domains. Next, we explore a few of such existing works.
The works of Jin et al. [45], [46] aim to build a system which
collects/aggregates sensory data from the mobile devices of
different users. Their proposal relies on an incentive mecha-
nism in order to encourage others to share their mobile sensor
data. This is in contrast to Social Anchor as the users in
Social Anchor are self-motivated to aggregate and share their
personal data in order to access some online services and
hence, do not rely on any incentive mechanism. The notion
of privacy is handled in a different way in their works. For
example, their system requires to ensure that the privacy of
different users is guaranteed while aggregating sensor data
from different devices of different users. On the other hand,
Social Anchor tries to ensure the privacy of a single user by
enabling the user to control what data she wants to release to
a service provider.
In another work, Qian et al. [47] proposed a system to
aggregate user behaviour data frommultiple devices so that it
could facilitate a privacy-preserving analysis over this data set
by any third party. Their system uses Homomorphic Encryp-
tion and Differential Privacy to achieve this goal. Their notion
of privacy is, however, different than ours. For example,
the main focus of their work is to enable privacy-preserving
analysis whereas we mainly focus on releasing data to a
service provider in a privacy-friendly manner by giving users
the required control before any data is released. That is
why we consider their work not to be very relevant to our
work.
A comparison of the analysed works with respect to Social
Anchor is provided in Table 4 against the set of selected crite-
ria. Here, Att. Agg. is the shortened expression for Attribute
Aggregation while Sel. Dis., Exp. Con. and Formal V. rep-
resent Selective Disclosure, Explicit Consent and Formal
Verification respectively. We have used the notation ‘X’ to
indicate a work meets the corresponding criterion while the
notation ‘7’ implies the corresponding criterion is not met by
the respective work. It is clearly evident from Table 4, other
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than Social Anchor, none of the previous works meets the
selected criteria.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this article, we have presented Social Anchor - a sys-
tem to aggregate attributes from different SN IdPs in a
privacy-friendly fashion. This is the first system to enable
users to aggregate attributes from these IdPs and release
them to a SAML SP in a semi-automatic way so that the
users do not need to provide such information manually.
The whole system has been designed and developed with
the aim of empowering users in preserving their privacy.
In particular, Social Anchor facilitates the selective disclo-
sure of attributes, a feature absent in most SN IdPs. Even
worse, users are often obscured from what attributes are
released to an SP from these IdPs. Social Anchor in a way
provides an overlay of privacy protection that allows a user
to know and to select each single piece of attribute that will
be released to a SAML SP. Furthermore, it releases such
attributes only after the respective users provides her explicit
consent.
We have presented two different architectures of Social
Anchor to illustrate two different deployment strategies. The
first architecture is simple to deploy and has no access lim-
itation. On the other hand, the second architecture provides
more empowerment to a user as it can be used to aggregate
attributes at a personal and portable IdP which is under the
full control of a user. However, it has limitations in the sense
that attributes can be only be aggregated from a browser
of a mobile device where such an IdP is deployed. Having
based on the work of [2], Social Anchor satisfies a num-
ber of functional, security and privacy requirements which
have been analysed in details in the article. Specifically,
we have presented a formal analysis of Social Anchor using
AVISPA to ensure its security during its complex protocol
flow. Finally, the performance of Social Anchor has been
analysed.
With the raising popularities of different SN IdPs, it is
safe to assume that they will store an increasing number of
our sensitive attributes. These attributes represent a lucrative
asset and can be leveraged to access a wide range of online
services. As the current setting dictates, such attributes are
scattered across different IdPs and there is no mechanism
to aggregate such attributes at a trusted entity so that they
can be released in a single session to an SP. Social Anchor
breaks this barrier and provides an opportunity to introduce a
new era of online services. That is why we are confident that
Social Anchor will be an important tool for providing next
generation online services while protecting the privacy of
users.
In future, we would like to explore how novel emerg-
ing technologies can be utilised to improve the architecture
of Social Anchor. In recent years, smart-contract enabled
blockchain systems such as Ethereum [48] and Hyper-
ledger [49] have emerged as one of the most influential
technologies offering numerous possibilities. We would like
to investigate how such blockchain systems can be incor-
porated into the architecture of Social Anchor to improve
its current limitations and to extend its current range of
functionalities.
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